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This article examines the concept of emodiversity, put forward by Quoidbach et al. (2014) as 
a novel source of information about “the health of the human emotional ecosystem” 
(p. 2057).  Quoidbach et al. drew an analogy between emodiversity as a desirable property of 
a person’s emotional make-up and biological diversity as a desirable property of an 
ecosystem.  They claimed that emodiversity was an independent predictor of better mental 
and physical health outcomes in two large-scale studies.  Here, we show that Quoidbach et 
al.’s construct of emodiversity suffers from several theoretical and practical deficiencies, 
which make these authors’ use of Shannon’s (1948) entropy formula to measure emodiversity 
highly questionable.  Our reanalysis of Quoidbach et al.’s two studies shows that the 
apparently substantial effects that these authors reported are likely due to a failure to conduct 
appropriate hierarchical regression in one case, and to suppression effects in the other.  It 
appears that Quoidbach et al.’s claims about emodiversity may reduce to little more than a set 
of computational and statistical artifacts. 
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Quoidbach et al. (2014) presented a novel construct, emodiversity, to represent the 
degree to which an individual experiences a wide range of emotions, analogous to the idea of 
biodiversity in the natural environment.  Emodiversity can be conceptualized either on 
separate axes of positive and negative emodiversity, or as a single overall “global 
emodiversity.”  In two large studies, Quoidbach et al. claimed to have found associations 
between emodiversity and health outcomes, independent of the associations between the 
corresponding positive or negative emotions and those outcomes: “Emodiversity is a 
practically important and previously unidentified metric for assessing the health of the human 
emotional ecosystem” (Quoidbach et al., 2014, p. 2057). 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) operationalized emodiversity in terms of a concept from the 
field of information theory known as Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948).  They claimed that 
this concept, originally devised by Shannon to represent the information content of a message 
in a communication system, also “quantifies the number of species and the evenness of 
species in a biological ecosystem” (p. 2058).  In support of this claim, they cited Magurran 
(2004), who actually cautioned that “most commentators who discuss the relative merits of 
the various methods of measuring diversity go out of their way to underline the disadvantages 
of the Shannon index” (Magurran, 2004, p. 106).  Leaving aside that debate, however, the 
validity of Quoidbach et al.’s concept clearly depends on the degree to which it faithfully 
implements Shannon entropy; its ability to generate reliable, meaningful, and measureable 
variance across participants; and the behavior of emodiversity when applied to real data.  The 
present article examines whether emodiversity lives up to these requirements. 
This article is structured as follows.  First, we examine the theoretical underpinnings 
of emodiversity, especially the applicability of Shannon entropy to the specific context of a 
multi-item measure of emotions using Likert-type responses.  Second,  we reanalyze 
Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) empirical findings to identify where the purported evidence for 
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their remarkable claims about the health benefits of emodiversity might have come from.  
Finally, we briefly discuss the broader lessons to be learned from this case. 
 
Theoretical issues 
Limitations of the analogy with biodiversity 
Biodiversity is defined in terms of the richness and evenness of the variety of species within 
an ecosystem.  Richness is the number of distinct species to be found in a given sample, 
regardless of how many examples (provided that the number is greater than zero) of that 
species are detected, while evenness is the degree to which the populations of each species 
(or, in some definitions, the corresponding biomass) are similar.  In Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) 
definition of emodiversity, the equivalent of biological richness is the number of different 
emotions experienced, while the equivalent of evenness is the extent to which the frequency 
with which a person reports experiencing each emotion is similar across all of the measured 
emotions.  However, both of these dimensions of emodiversity are subject to limitations that 
are not present in Shannon’s (1948) original model or in the Shannon-Wiener index of 
biodiversity. These limitations severely impair the correspondence between emodiversity and 
Shannon entropy. 
Richness.  In a biodiversity setting, the richness of a community is usually unbounded.  
Certainly, it would be unusual for richness to be subjected to an a priori upper limit imposed 
by the designer of a field study.  With emodiversity, however, the degree to which the 
richness of participants’ emotional experience can be captured is limited by the number of 
items making up the measure being used.  For example, in their Study 1, Quoidbach et al. 
(2014) used the mDES scale, asking participants how often they experienced each of nine 
positive and nine negative emotions in a recent period. In contrast, the PANAS-X (Watson & 
Clark, 1994) measures 30 different positive emotions (and 30 negative ones); for example, 
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this scale allows participants to provide distinct reports of the extent to which they feel calm, 
relaxed, and at ease.  Leaving aside for a moment questions of the meaning of taxonomies of 
emotions (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2003; Solomon, 2002) and the possible discrepancies—whether 
caused by demand characteristics, social desirability concerns, faulty recollection, or some 
other issue—between people’s actual emotional experiences and how they describe them, 
especially if they are asked about experiences in the past rather than the present (Robinson & 
Clore, 2002), this would seem to imply that emodiversity should be measured using a scale 
that allows the greatest possible number of emotions to be reported. By analogy, sending a 
field biologist out to report the number of (only) rabbits, mice, rats, voles, and beavers in a 
given area, while ignoring foxes or wolves because there was no corresponding space on the 
form, might lead to suboptimal decisions about conservation policy.  However, Quoidbach et 
al. did not address this question, although it appears to be of crucial theoretical importance; in 
their two empirical studies, they used measures with only nine and 10 positive and negative 
emotions, respectively. 
Evenness.  When the Shannon-Wiener index is used in field biology, the count 
associated with each species is precisely the number of examples of that species observed in 
the community.  However, a self-report by participants in a psychological study of the extent 
to which they experienced various emotions will not typically be expressed in terms of a 
count of discrete occasions.  A question such as “How many times did you experience 
contentment in the last week?” is almost meaningless; for one thing, the existence of 20 
distinct occasions of contentment implies 20 transitions from a state of non-contentment, so 
that somebody who remained contented the whole time would have a very low score.  Like 
most researchers asking about past emotional states, Quoidbach et al. (2014) used measures 
that asked participants to report the relative frequency with which they experienced each 
emotion on a Likert-type scale, with the following possible responses: 0: Never; 1: Rarely; 2: 
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Some of the time; 3: Often; 4: Most of the time
1
.  But this decision imposes severe limitations 
on the potentially measurable (un)evenness of emotions (to go with the limitations noted 
above on the measurement of richness), because the range of possible values is so small.  It is 
equivalent to a field biologist who uses the Shannon-Wiener index to measure biodiversity 
reporting the numbers of each species that were observed as None, A few, Some, Quite a lot, 
and Very many, with these groupings subsequently being coded 0–4 and the resulting 
numbers injected into Shannon’s formula.  Such an operation would result in the loss of a 
great deal of information compared to the recording of the exact numbers of each species that 
were observed. 
Could this problem be alleviated by asking participants to report the frequency with 
which they experienced each emotion on a wider numerical scale, perhaps in the range 0–
100?  This would seem to allow the relative frequency of emotional experiences to be 
described with greater (albeit still bounded) precision, thus allowing for more differentiation 
of the “evenness” component of emodiversity.  However, it is unclear whether many 
individuals are sufficiently aware of their emotional experiences that they could meaningfully 
assign values of, say, 34 to one and 37 to another.  In a classic paper, Miller (1956) described 
the general problem of people’s limited ability to distinguish between more than about seven 
levels of a unidimensional construct.  Experience from several fields with these kinds of 
numerical-rating scales (e.g., Berbaum, Dorfman, Franken, & Caldwell, 2002; DeSoto, 2016; 
Mickes, Wixted, & Wais, 2007) suggests that the most responses will likely be multiples of 
                                                 
1
 In fact, Quoidbach et al. (2014) did not report the exact responses corresponding to the 
values 1, 2, and 3.  We have assumed that the version of the mDES that these authors used in 
Study 1 was similar to that described by Fredrickson (2013), from which the responses shown 
here are taken, and that the responses for the unspecified 10-item measure used in Study 2 
were labeled similarly. 
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10, with a tendency to cluster further around 0, 50, and 100.  The problem for emodiversity is 
that if each respondent only uses, say, five different numbers from the range of 0–100 to 
describe their frequencies of emotional experience, then the result is mathematically 
equivalent to the case where they are constrained to choose from a range of 0–4, and this 
holds even if every participant chooses a different set of five numbers.  Perhaps a better way 
to measure the range and variety of a person’s emotional experiences, suggested by a 
reviewer of the present article, might be to use some form of diary, with sampling of 
emotions at either regular or random intervals (e.g., the Experience Sampling Method; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987); provided that a sufficient number of “species” of emotion 
could be defined, this could potentially result in measures of evenness that are more 
mathematically meaningful. 
Numerical effects of bounded richness and evenness 
Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) failure to correctly implement the concept of Shannon 
entropy, described in the preceding section, has immediate and severe consequences for the 
numerical behavior of the measurement of emodiversity.  We enumerated all possible 
combinations of zero (Never) and non-zero responses for a variety of possible numbers of 
scale items and response formats (0–4 and 0–100).  The results, shown in detail in our 
Supplemental Information, demonstrate that unless a participant responds that they Never 
experience about two-thirds of the emotions being measured—a contingency that would 
probably raise questions about the validity of the instrument being used—the ratio between 
the lowest and highest possible emodiversity values is very small (about 1.1:1 for a scale 
having a 0–4 response format and 1.5:1 for one with a 0–100 response format).  Furthermore, 
even this range of values is only possible under rather implausible circumstances, because the 
highest and lowest scores for emodiversity are obtained when participants exhibit highly 
unusual response patterns (all identical responses for the maximum score; alternating extreme 
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responses, or large numbers of Never responses, for the minimum score).  Normally, 
however, psychologists do not say that individuals who display such response patterns “have 
high [or low] emotional diversity.”  Rather, they say that such people “are not paying 
attention,” and typically exclude these participants’ data altogether.  Hence, the practical 
range of emodiversity values from any given measure of emotions is even less than the 
mathematical limits would suggest.  To summarize, we believe that emodiversity—as defined 
by Quoidbach et al. using the Shannon entropy formula and implemented using short emotion 
measures with limited ranges of responses—is unlikely to provide any meaningful amount of 
variance, independent of the underlying emotion measure, to be explained empirically. 
Abundance is not measured 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) defined people’s emodiversity as “the variety and relative 
abundance of the emotions they experience” (p. 2057).  However, it is not clear that the 
formula these authors used to calculate emodiversity fully corresponds to this definition.  The 
formula generates the highest possible value of emodiversity when all of the responses are 
equal and non-zero: “If all the emotions of the list were evenly experienced, then 
emodiversity would be maximal” (Quoidbach et al., 2014, p. 2059; emphasis in original).  
However, this maximum value of emodiversity is attained whatever this non-zero value 
might be (1, 2, 3, or 4).  This means that Alice, who experiences all nine positive emotions 
(alertness, amusement, etc.) only Rarely, has exactly the same emodiversity as Bob, who 
experiences all of these emotions Most of the time, and higher emodiversity than Carol, who 
experiences four of the nine emotions Some of the time and five of them Often.  Furthermore, 
any increase in Alice’s experience of one of these emotions will result in an immediate 
reduction in her emodiversity.  Given Quoidbach et al.’s claims about the health benefits of 
higher emodiversity, this would appear to be a good reason for Alice not to attempt to 
increase her currently minimal frequency of, say, amusement to Some of the time by watching 
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comedy shows until she is sure that she can simultaneously increase the frequency with 
which she experiences the other positive emotions to the same extent. 
Thus, once a minimum level of frequency of experiencing emotions has been 
established, there can be no “benefit” (of increased emodiversity) in increasing the frequency 
with which one experiences any particular emotion, unless this specific emotion is in some 
way “lagging” behind the others (for example, if one currently experiences eight emotions 
Often and one only Some of the time).  It is therefore not clear where the “relative abundance” 
component of Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) definition of emodiversity is to be found, given that a 
person experiencing all positive emotions only Rarely already has the highest possible 
emodiversity score.  This result also suggests that any difference in emodiversity between 
two participants who report Never experiencing the same number of emotions is very likely 
to be nothing more than noise. 
 
Empirical Issues 
In the first part of this article, we have shown that Quoidbach et al. (2014)’s 
emodiversity is merely a pastiche of Shannon entropy, with a number of conceptual lacunae 
that make the application of Shannon’s (1948) formula invalid.  (For reasons of space, we 
have omitted some other important problems, such as the apparent requirement that 
participants be forced to provide responses to all items on the emotion measures being used, 
or the questionable validity of applying the arithmetic of Shannon’s formula to numbers that 
are merely categorical labels on participants’ reports of the frequency with which emotions 
were experienced; these and other issues are covered in detail in our Supplemental 
Information.)  In fact, we believe that any observed variance in emodiversity is likely to be 
little more than statistical noise.  In view of this, it is necessary to explain how Quoidbach et 
al. (2014) concluded that emodiversity independently predicted depression (Study 1) or an 
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assortment of physical health outcomes (Study 2) to the substantial degree that they reported 
in their article.  In this part, therefore, we examine how these results might have come about, 
if this were not due to the claimed predictive power of emodiversity. 
Study 1 
Dr. Quoidbach (personal communication, November 15, 2015) kindly provided us 
with the data set for Study 1, which examined the relation between emodiversity and 
depressive symptoms, while controlling for emotions, in a sample of 35,844 participants who 
were recruited via a television show. Using SPSS, we were able to reproduce perfectly all of 
the results reported by Quoidbach et al. (2014) in their article.  However, we conducted the 
majority of our reanalyses in R; our code is available at https://osf.io/vu4uq/. 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) claimed that the results of their regressions showed that 
emodiversity substantially and significantly predicted their main outcome variable 
(depression), over and above the effect of positive or negative emotions themselves.  For 
example, when positive emotion, positive emodiversity, and their interaction were entered 
into a regression, the reported standardized regression coefficients (β) of these three terms 
were, respectively, −.40, −.36, and −.14
2
.  However, simply reporting these coefficients (and 
their corresponding partial rs) does not demonstrate a substantial effect of emodiversity.  
First, as our Table 1 shows, when positive emodiversity and the interaction term are entered 
                                                 
2
 When we reproduced this regression in SPSS, we obtained the same results reported by 
Quoidbach et al. (2014).  However, when we performed the same operations in R, the β 
coefficient for the interaction was −.09, although the other two coefficients were identical.  
We wonder whether this might not already be an indication that multicollinearity may be 
causing problems for the OLS regression algorithms used by one or both of these software 
packages. 
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into a hierarchical regression after first entering positive emotion, there is almost no increase 
in the variance explained at each step; R
2
 increases from .381 (positive emotion only) to .394 
(addition of positive emodiversity) to .397 (addition of the interaction term).  That is, the 
addition of emodiversity and the interaction term make very little difference to the 
explanatory power of the model, with just 1.3% of extra variance explained by emodiversity 
and another 0.3% explained by the interaction.  (For negative emodiversity, the amount of 
additional variance explained is essentially zero, as explained in the section entitled “The 
effect of adding quadratic terms to the regression models” in our Supplemental Information.)  
Second, when the interaction term is added, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all three 
terms become quite large, further suggesting that multicollinearity is playing a major role (as 
could be expected from the correlation of .75 between positive emotion and positive 
emodiversity).  Third, when the interaction term is entered, the standardized regression 
coefficient (β) for emodiversity more than doubles in magnitude, from −.175 to −.364, 
suggesting that substantial confounding effects are emerging at this point. 
Our Table 1 also shows the similar results that are obtained when hierarchical 
techniques are used to explore the other regression analyses in Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) 
Study 1.  For negative emotion and emodiversity, R
2
 remains static (within the limitations of 
rounding) at .460 when emodiversity is added to the basic regression of depressive symptoms 
on negative emotion, and increases only to .466 when the interaction term is added; 
furthermore, similar patterns of high VIFs and suppression values are observed as for positive 
emotion and emodiversity.  The addition of global emodiversity to a model predicting 
depression from positive and negative emotion results in a negligible increase in R
2
 (from 
.592 to .595), and further suppression effects can be observed.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that emodiversity has little independent contribution to make to the prediction of 
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depressive symptoms, over and above the well-established role of positive and negative 
emotions in that regard. 
Study 2 
In their Study 2, using a nationally representative sample of 10,000 Belgian adults, 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) claimed that both positive and negative emodiversity, when entered 
into a multiple regression together with the corresponding emotion scores and the interaction 
between these two variables, predicted health outcomes such as doctor’s visits, days spent in 
hospital, and medical expenditure better than factors whose associations with health are well-
established, such as diet, exercise, and smoking.  If these claims were to be verified, the 
implications for public health policy would be substantial.  In principle, a simple 
questionnaire asking people how often they experienced particular emotions in the past week 
would potentially provide better information about the population’s health status for a whole 
year than complex measures of actual behavior. 
Unfortunately, the data for Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Study 2 are not currently 
publicly available.  As a result, we have been unable to determine whether the same issues 
concerning the lack of additional predicted variance when emodiversity is added to the 
regression model, seen in Study 1, are also present in Study 2. However, even without access 
to the data, it can be readily shown that many of the results in Study 2 are the result of 
statistical suppression effects.  For example, when Quoidbach et al. entered positive 
emodiversity, mean positive emotion, and their interaction into a regression predicting 
doctor’s visits, they reported obtaining a standardized regression coefficient (β) for positive 
emodiversity of −.29.  But their Table 2 shows that the zero-order correlation between 
positive emodiversity and doctor’s visits was just −.05.  The presence, in multiple regression 
results, of a β coefficient of greater magnitude (or different sign) to the zero-order correlation 
between the same variables indicates that suppression has occurred.  Suppression is often 
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seen in regression models when two predictors are correlated, with at least one of them 
having a correlation with the outcome variable that is either zero (a situation referred to as 
“classical” suppression) or only relatively modest in magnitude compared to the correlation 
of the other predictor (“negative suppression”). However, suppression will also (always) 
occur when two predictors are positively correlated with each other—even to a very small 
extent—while having correlations of opposite sign with the outcome (“reciprocal 
suppression”). 
Inspection of Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Table 3 suggests that suppression effects are 
behind the great majority of the results from Study 2.  Of the 18 zero-order correlations 
between positive, negative, and global emodiversity and Quoidbach et al.’s list of six health 
outcomes, only two (positive emodiversity correlated with doctor’s costs, and negative 
emodiversity correlated with hospital costs, both at r = −.07) are large enough to be 
statistically significant at the .05 level, even with the sample size of 1,273; this suggests that 
there is uncertainty about the magnitude, and even the sign, of some of these correlations.  
However, when these data were used in a regression model, Quoidbach et al. reported 
standardized regression coefficients (β) of greater magnitude than the zero-order correlations 
in all 18 cases, with 16 of these being statistically significant at the .05 level.  Each of these 
coefficients appears to be the product of suppression effects.  For positive emodiversity, these 
effects mostly take the form of negative suppression, resulting from the high correlation 
between positive emotion and emodiversity, combined with the fact that the zero-order 
correlations between positive emodiversity and the outcome variable are smaller than those 
between positive emotion and the outcome variable
3
.  In contrast, for negative emodiversity 
                                                 
3
 Specifically, for two predictors X1 and X2 and an outcome Y, suppression will occur if the 
pattern of correlations between these three variables is such that rYX1/rYX2 < rX1X2, where 
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the suppression effects mostly take the form of reciprocal suppression, caused by the positive 
correlations between negative emotion and emodiversity and between negative emotion and 
the outcome, combined with the negative correlation between negative emodiversity and the 
outcome (Conger, 1974). 
In the absence of a solid theoretical explanation, results based on suppression are 
typically uninterpretable.  Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, and Tracy (2004) presented what 
they claimed were two reproducible examples of suppression situations in psychology, but 
there do not seem to be many major effects in the psychological literature that are 
consistently and reliably explained in terms of theoretically-justified suppression.  In 
particular, the existence of classical, negative, and reciprocal suppression effects in the same 
study seems difficult to explain theoretically, since these effects result from different patterns 
of relationships between predictors and outcome (Conger, 1974).  It seems to us that by far 
the most parsimonious explanation here is that most of the statistically significant β 
coefficients in Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Study 2 are the result of a combination of noisy data 
and the high correlation between the predictors (i.e., positive or negative emotion and the 
corresponding form of emodiversity). 
 
Conclusion 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) drew some far-reaching conclusions about the impact of 
emodiversity on mental and physical health from their two correlational studies.  From their 
Study 1, they concluded that emodiversity has incremental predictive validity, over and above 
that associated with emotions of the same valence, for depression.  From their Study 2, they 
concluded that emodiversity was at least as good a predictor of physical health as regular 
                                                                                                                                                        
rAB is the zero-order correlation between any two variables A and B, and the identifiers X1 
and X2 are assigned so that rYX1 < rYX2. 
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exercise, a healthy diet, and refraining from smoking.  However, as we have shown, these 
results are almost certainly nothing more than a statistical mirage.  Once the regression 
analyses in Study 1 were conducted in a hierarchical manner it became clear that the 
incremental effect of emodiversity in terms of added variance explained was negligible, while 
in Study 2 the apparently substantial regression coefficients were shown to be the product of 
suppression effects.  In both cases, the fact that most of these regression coefficients and their 
associated partial correlation coefficients were statistically significant at the traditional .05 
level was neither surprising (given the large sample sizes used by Quoidbach et al.) nor very 
meaningful.  With many hundreds or thousands of participants, we feel that the effect size (as 
measured by the increase in R
2
) is a more appropriate indication of the influence of 
emodiversity than a p value. 
This problem appears to have arisen, at least in part, as a result of a misunderstanding 
of the principles of a mathematical concept that has been imported from another field.  As we 
have shown, Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) application of Shannon entropy is inappropriate, given 
the constraints imposed by the nature of the measures of emotional experience being used, 
such as the fact that a fixed number of emotions are measured, corresponding to a fixed list of 
“species,” and a limited number of responses are allowed, corresponding to a limited range of 
possible population values.  (This is not to suggest that, when applied to data obtained from 
more appropriate measures, Shannon entropy might not be useful in other areas of 
psychology or the social sciences more generally; see, for example, Vaquero & Cebrian, 
2013).  As one of us has pointed out previously (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013), 
researchers in psychology and other social sciences who wish to borrow concepts from the 
natural sciences or mathematics should ensure that they understand all of the conditions for 
the use of those concepts to be valid.  The fact that a set of mathematical formulae (such as 
those for calculating Shannon entropy, but also those for performing ordinary least squares 
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regression) can be applied to psychological data is no guarantee that the results that emerge 
from the application of these formulae will have any meaning in the real world. 
In conclusion, we do not claim that the idea of emotional diversity is inherently 
devoid of any possible utility.  However, in order for such utility to be demonstrated, it will 
be necessary to identify ways of operationalizing and measuring this construct that are not 
compromised by mathematical artifacts and statistical confounds.  In its present form, 
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Hierarchical linear models of positive, negative, and global emotion and emodiversity 
predicting depression from Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Study 1. 
Model 
number Variables Model R
2
 β SE VIF 
P.1   .381        
  Positive Emotion   −.617   0.017   1.000   
P.2   .394          
  Positive Emotion   −.485   0.026   2.298   
  Positive Emodiversity   −.175   0.026   2.298   
P.3   .397          
  Positive Emotion   −.396   0.010   5.939   
  Positive Emodiversity   −.364
c
  0.018   18.484   
  Interaction   −.143
r
  0.013   9.288   
      
N.1   .460         
  Negative Emotion   .678   0.004   1.000   
N.2   .460         
  Negative Emotion   .682
 s
  0.007   2.685   
  Negative Emodiversity   −.005
s
  0.007   2.685   
N.3   .466         
  Negative Emotion   .863
s
  0.011   8.149   
  Negative Emodiversity   −.196
s
  0.012   8.748   
  Interaction   −.143   0.007   3.409   
      
G.1   .592    
  Positive Emotion  −.402   0.004  1.219   
 Negative Emotion  .507   0.004  1.219   
G.2   .595    
  Positive Emotion  −.356   0.005  2.061   
 Negative Emotion  .553
c
  0.005  2.047   
 Global Emodiversity  −.070
s




 : Denotes a coefficient that has either a greater magnitude or a different sign compared to 
the corresponding zero-order correlation, indicating that suppression has occurred. 
c
 : Denotes a coefficient that has increased in magnitude from the previous step, indicating 
that some form of confounding has occurred. 
20 
r
 : The results in this table were calculated with SPSS.  When we performed the same 
regression in R, we obtained a value of −.094 (SE = 0.008) for this coefficient.  Only one of 
the other values in this table differed by more than .002 between SPSS and R, namely the 






This supplemental information document is divided into three parts.  Part 1 provides 
detailed descriptions and results of the numerical analyses of the effects of bounded richness 
and evenness on Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) construct of emodiversity.  Part 2 presents some 
extended footnotes to correspondingly-named sections in the main article.  Part 3 contains 
some specific standalone points that we omitted from the main article due to lack of space, 
and because they were less central to our argument. 
 
Part 1: Numerical analyses of the effects of bounded richness and evenness 
Table S1 shows the range of emodiversity for each possible number of zero-scored 
responses (corresponding to Never experiencing a particular emotion) on three emotion-
frequency measures.  The first two measures have nine and 20 items, respectively, with 
possible responses in the range 0–4; the third measure has nine items with possible responses 
ranging from 0–100.  The numerical effects of the severe constraints on the upper bounds on 
both richness and evenness imposed by Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) formulation of 
emodiversity can readily be seen in the rather small ranges between the minimum and 
maximum possible emodiversity values for any given number of non-zero (Never) responses.  
In each case, the lowest emodiversity is obtained when half of the non-zero responses are the 
lowest possible (i.e., 1) and the other half are the highest possible (i.e., 4 or 100, depending 
on the scale length); meanwhile, the highest emodiversity occurs when all of the non-zero 
responses are identical, regardless of which of the possible values in the range 1–4 (or 1–100) 
these non-zero responses all take. 
It can be readily seen that, once the number of zero (Never) responses is established, 
the possible variation in emodiversity is severely constrained, as indicated by the “Ratio” 
entries in Table S1, which show the ratio between the maximum and minimum possible 
2 
emodiversity values for each number of zero responses.  The maximum/minimum ratio 
increases only slightly as the number of zero responses increases; for the 20-item scale, the 
ratio progresses from a minimum of 1.069 to a maximum of 1.385 (in the case of a 
participant who reports Never experiencing 18 out of 20 emotions, plus one Rarely and one 
Most of the time, which might well be considered a severely atypical pattern of responses), 
until the entire process breaks down with 19 or 20 zeroes.  When the range of possible 
responses is expanded from 0–4 to 0–100, the ratio between maximum and minimum 
emodiversity for any given number of non-zero responses becomes somewhat larger; 
however, for the minimum evenness (and, hence, lowest emodiversity) to be obtained, 
participants would need to alternate between responses of 1 and 100 for every pair of 
emotions on the scale, which again would seem to be a highly unusual pattern, possibly 
indicative of acquiescence or boredom in participants.  Thus, the range of possible 
“legitimate” emodiversity values needs to be further reduced to take into account that reports 
of either maximum or minimum emodiversity may be more likely to reflect unthinking 
response patterns than a sincere reflection of participants’ experiences. 
A further problem whose genesis can be glimpsed in Table S1, and which we were 
able to observe more concretely in Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) empirical studies, is the likely 
presence of a high degree of skewness in emodiversity, because of the strong effect of a 
single experience of an emotion (moving the response from Never to Rarely), compared to 
that of other responses.  For example, Quoidbach et al.’s Table 3 shows that in Study 2 the 
maximum positive emodiversity score was 0.47 standard deviations (SDs) above the mean, 
whereas the minimum score was 13.1 SDs below the mean; indeed. Quoidbach et al. reported 
(p. 2062) that they applied a transformation to the emodiversity data in this study to address 
this skewness.  In Study 1 the skewness was less dramatic, in that the maximum positive 
emodiversity was 0.72 SDs above the mean and the minimum was “only” 4.32 SDs below the 
3 
mean; nevertheless, the overall skewness for positive, negative, and global emodiversity in 
Study 1 were −2.52, −0.92, and −1.54, respectively.  We investigated the effects of 
attempting to correct this skewness by squaring (or raising to an even higher power) these 
emodiversity variables.  However, when we did this, the correlation of these new transformed 
variables for positive and negative emodiversity with their respective emotion measures 
became even higher than before (e.g., for negative emodiversity, the correlation with negative 
emotion increased from .79 to .86 when emodiversity was squared).  Hence, it seems that this 
high skewness is likely to be another suboptimal aspect of emodiversity data that researchers 




Table S1 1 
Minimum and maximum possible emodiversity values, and the ratio of maximum to minimum, for each possible number of zero-scored 2 
responses on three different possible scales with different lengths and scoring ranges. 3 
 9-item scale (scored 0–4)  20-item scale (scored 0–4)  9-item scale (scored 0–100)  
Zeroes Minimum Maximum Ratio  Minimum Maximum Ratio  Minimum Maximum Ratio  
0 1.988 2.197 1.105  2.803 2.996 1.069  1.456 2.197 1.510  
1 1.887 2.079 1.102  2.744 2.944 1.073  1.442 2.079 1.442  
2 1.733 1.946 1.123  2.698 2.890 1.071  1.172 1.946 1.660  
3 1.599 1.792 1.121  2.632 2.833 1.077  1.154 1.792 1.552  
4 1.390 1.609 1.158  2.580 2.773 1.075  0.776 1.609 2.074  
5 1.194 1.386 1.161  2.505 2.708 1.081  0.749 1.386 1.852  
6 0.868 1.099 1.266  2.446 2.639 1.079  0.110 1.099 9.978  
7 0.500 0.693 1.385  2.361 2.565 1.087  0.056 0.693 12.479  
8 0.000 0.000 n/a  2.292 2.485 1.084  0.000 0.000 n/a  
9 0.000 0.000 n/a  2.192 2.398 1.094  0.000 0.000 n/a  
10     2.110 2.303 1.091      
11     1.988 2.197 1.105      
12     1.887 2.079 1.102      
13     1.733 1.946 1.123      
14     1.599 1.792 1.121      
15     1.390 1.609 1.158      
16     1.194 1.386 1.161      
17     0.868 1.099 1.266      
18     0.500 0.693 1.385      
19     0.000 0.000 n/a      




1. The possible emodiversity values for the 9-item (scored 0–4) scale with 0, 1, 2, etc., zero-scored items are identical to the 6 
corresponding items for the 20-item (scored 0–4) scale with 11, 12, 13, etc. zero-scored items.  More generally, the range for an N-7 
item scale (N < 20) can be obtained by taking the last N items of the 20-item scale. 8 
2. The alternating increase and decrease in the ratio as the number of zeroes increases (particularly noticeable for the 9-item scale scored 9 
0–100) represents the fact that minimum emodiversity increases by a smaller amount when the number of non-zero items on the scale 10 
becomes odd (when a value of 1 is added to the list of non-zero item scores) than when it becomes even (when the maximum value or 11 




Part 2: Extended Footnotes 15 
Notes for “Limitations of the analogy with biodiversity” 16 
Richness vs. Evenness: There is some debate among biologists as to whether richness 17 
and evenness should be considered separately, because they are typically closely related 18 
empirically (Stirling & Wilsey, 2001).  While specific individual measures of both richness 19 
and evenness exist, the Shannon entropy formula—sometimes referred to as the Shannon-20 
Wiener index—functions as a composite measure: Once the Shannon-Wiener value (denoted 21 
by H´) for the biodiversity of a community has been established, an increase in either richness 22 
or evenness will produce a larger H´ value.  This ambiguity could be considered a weakness 23 
of attempts to repurpose Shannon’s original concept beyond its originally intended field of 24 
communication.  In Shannon’s (1948) model, the practical outcome of either a greater 25 
number of different characters in the message (“richness”) or a greater variety in the 26 
distribution of those characters (“evenness”) is the same, namely an increase in the number of 27 
bits required to uniquely encode the message.  In other words, when applied to electronic 28 
communications, richness and evenness are two sides of the same coin, whereas in biology 29 
(and emodiversity), this relation is considerably more complex. 30 
Taxonomy of emotion scales: The nine positive emotions measured by the mDES, 31 
used by Quoidbach et al. (2014) in their Study 1, are alertness, amusement, awe, contentment, 32 
gratitude, hope, joy, love, and pride.  In their Study 2, Quoidbach et al. used a different, 33 
unnamed measure, with ten positive emotions: amusement, awe, contentment, enthusiasm, 34 
gratitude, happiness, interest, joy, pride, and serenity (of which only six are common to this 35 
measure and the mDES).  Had Quoidbach et al. instead taken their set of emotions from the 36 
PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which certainly seems plausible—for example, 37 
the filename of the “emodiversity calculator” spreadsheet that we downloaded from the 38 
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emodiversity.org website on October 28, 2015 was “Emodiversity Calculator 20 39 
emotion items (like PANAS).xlsx”—their list would have been even more different 40 
from the mDES.  The PANAS uses adjectives rather than nouns to ask participants how they 41 
are (or were) feeling; its list of 10 positive emotions consists of the words active, alert, 42 
attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, inspired, interested, proud, and strong.  Thus, the 43 
mDES and PANAS have only two positive emotions (alertness and pride) in common.  It is 44 
difficult to imagine how one could reliably compare emodiversity values across populations 45 
using such different instruments.  Yet, the emodiversity calculator spreadsheet invites 46 
researchers to use any emotion measure of their choice, as long as the scale is zero-based.  47 
(Note that a base of zero for the responses is a mathematical requirement of the way the 48 
emodiversity formula is constructed; any existing scale that uses a response format that starts 49 
above zero, such as 1–7, will need to be rebased to zero in order to be used to calculate 50 
emodiversity.) 51 
A further complication is that emodiversity values that have been derived from two 52 
measures with different numbers of items are not commensurate. The range of emodiversity 53 
values for a 10-item scale (maximum emodiversity 2.30) is different from that of an 18-item 54 
scale (maximum emodiversity 2.89).  Thus, unless a decision is made to standardize on a 55 
definitive number of items, there is no prospect of a universal scale of values of emodiversity; 56 
any given individual will have a 10-item emodiversity score, an 18-item score, and so on.  57 
This represents a further departure from the application of Shannon entropy to 58 
communication or biodiversity; in both of those cases, any message or community has 59 
exactly one entropy value, and these values can be readily compared across messages or 60 
communities. 61 
Notes for “Empirical Issues” 62 
8 
Need for stepwise reporting. Quoidbach et al. (2014) reported the results of their 63 
multiple regressions only at the final step, with all variables included.  But in the presence of 64 
correlated predictors, without an indication of the evolution of the model as variables are 65 
added, it is almost impossible to evaluate whether the focal variables of the study are really 66 
those that are driving the observed effects.  Had Quoidbach et al. followed this 67 
recommendation, reporting the extra variance explained at each step, the limited power of 68 
emodiversity to explain unique variance (beyond the corresponding measure of emotions) in 69 
both of their studies would have been more readily apparent.  (We note that Quoidbach et al. 70 
did report, in the summary paragraph for their Study 1, that emodiversity explained only 71 
about 1% of the variance in depression.) 72 
No apparent checks for automatic responding.  We noted in our main article that the 73 
highest and lowest values of emodiversity are to be found in cases of extreme response 74 
patterns.  The participants in Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Study 1 were recruited through a TV 75 
advertisement that appeared in a popular show dedicated to happiness; this advertisement 76 
invited viewers to visit the show’s website in order to participate.  In addition to the risk of 77 
sampling bias, the relatively casual nature of this recruitment process might be expected to 78 
include a number of people who might not necessarily spend a lot of time carefully 79 
considering their responses.  Indeed, of Quoidbach et al.’s 41,723 participants, 637 reported 80 
identical frequencies of experience of all nine positive emotions (288 Never, 349 some non-81 
zero frequency), while 1,298 (1,220 Never, 78 non-zero) reported identical frequencies of 82 
experience of all nine negative emotions.  However, it does not appear that any participants 83 
were excluded from Quoidbach et al.’s analyses purely on the basis of identical responses. 84 
 85 
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Part 3: Some further topics 86 
Distortions introduced by the time period under study 87 
The capacity of any of the instruments used by Quoidbach et al. (2014) to measure 88 
emodiversity depends on the time period for which participants are invited to report their 89 
emotional experiences.  This is because, of the possible responses to the scale items, one 90 
(Never) is an absolute number (i.e., the emotion was experienced on a total of zero occasions 91 
during the entire period in question, whatever the length of this period), whereas the others 92 
are expressed in terms of an informal proportion of the time available.  For example, consider 93 
what would happen if the word “week” in the (presumed) question “How often did you 94 
experience each of these emotions in the past week?” were to be replaced with the word 95 
“month.”  Assuming that a person’s experiences of emotions are fairly stable over time, their 96 
relative proportion of responses from Rarely through Most of the time ought to be similar for 97 
any given time period; that is, someone who, over the course of a typical week, is alert Most 98 
of the time and only Rarely embarrassed will probably report experiencing those emotions 99 
with similar relative frequencies over the course of a month.  Indeed, in order for Quoidbach 100 
et al.’s claims about the ability of emodiversity scores measured over any given week (which 101 
we presume was the time period used in these authors’ empirical studies) to predict long-term 102 
mental and physical health outcomes to be valid, such an assumption about the temporal 103 
stability of the frequency of emotional experiences would seem to be not just plausible, but 104 
necessary.  Otherwise, Quoidbach et al.’s inferences about health outcomes over the course of 105 
months or years from a single week’s emodiversity scores would appear to be potentially 106 
subject to a great deal of random variation depending on the week in question. 107 
In contrast, when the period under consideration is extended from a week to a month 108 
(or longer), the number of Never responses is likely to be reduced, simply because more time 109 
is available for each emotion to have been experienced at least once.  Perhaps Dave has not 110 
10 
been embarrassed in the past week, but he might have had an awkward moment three weeks 111 
ago, thus causing him to respond that he experienced embarrassment Rarely (versus Never) 112 
when the time period is expanded to a month.  The importance of this point is illustrated 113 
when we examine the influence of zero-coded (Never) responses on the calculation of 114 
emodiversity.  In the data set for Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Study 1, we found a correlation of 115 
−.96 between the count of Never responses for each participant to either the positive or 116 
negative mDES subscale and the respective measure of emodiversity.  (This correlation 117 
would be somewhat lower for a 0–100 response format, but only to the extent that 118 
participants use a wider range of response values, which—as we mentioned in our main 119 
article—appears to be unlikely in practice.)  This remarkably high correlation provides a 120 
further illustration of the point that we made in our main article regarding the limited range of 121 
possible emodiversity values (indeed, it is a mathematical corollary of that limited range).  122 
Once the number of Never responses is established, emodiversity is almost completely static, 123 
so that increasing one’s experience of an emotion beyond Rarely has almost no effect (and 124 
what effect it does have is as likely to be negative as positive); yet, the number of Never 125 
responses depends on the essentially arbitrary choice of time period used for the measure of 126 
emotions.  A measure that asked people how many times they had experienced each emotion 127 
in the past year—which might be highly valid in an investigation of people’s long-term 128 
emotional experiences—would likely reveal that many of them had almost the same 129 
emodiversity, as most people would not be able to give a response of Never to the majority of 130 
the items. 131 
Forced responses to all scale items 132 
Shannon’s (1948) index of entropy quantifies the diversity among (only) the observed 133 
characters in a message.  For example, the one-word message cataract contains three 134 




.  The fact that the other letters of the alphabet do not appear in this message is 136 
irrelevant, as is the length of the alphabet.  Similarly, when the Shannon-Wiener index is used 137 
in field biology, only the observed species are of interest; the fact that no aardvark or zebra 138 
was sighted during a field study of a Welsh bog does not affect the biodiversity index of that 139 
community.  By definition, there is no such thing as an observation of zero occurrences of a 140 
character, or zero members of a species, in these situations.  In contrast, the structure of the 141 
psychologist’s questionnaire—which is equivalent to taking along a pre-printed checklist of 142 
possible species, rather than a blank sheet of paper, to observe a biological community—143 
means that there is a difference between the absence of any report concerning a particular 144 
phenomenon, and a concrete statement that the phenomenon did not occur.  The 145 
psychological equivalent of the absence of the letter q in Shannon’s message, or of the failure 146 
to observe any tigers in a field study in biology, is not a report by the participant that an 147 
emotion was never experienced; rather, it is the absence of a response to the item concerning 148 
that emotion.  These two situations are clearly distinct.  For example, when the mDES is used 149 
to calculate a participant’s mean level of positive emotions, a response of Never—coded as 150 
zero—to a particular emotion item has an effect on the participant’s mean positive emotions 151 
score, by increasing the denominator (i.e., the total number of responses), in a way that a 152 
failure to respond—which would simply be ignored in the calculation of the mean—would 153 
not. 154 
                                                 
1
 This value is calculated using binary (base 2) logarithms, as used by Shannon (1948).  
Binary logarithms are appropriate in the case of communication systems because one is 
typically interested in the number of bits that a coded message will occupy.  Natural 
logarithms, as used by Quoidbach et al. (2014), are arguably more appropriate for other 
applications of Shannon’s formula.  When natural logarithms are used, the Shannon entropy 
of the message cataract is multiplied by ln(2), or 0.6931, to give 1.32. 
12 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) therefore needed to handle the separate possibilities of a 155 
missing response and an explicit zero-coded response
2
.  However, their choice to treat a 156 
response of Never as making no contribution to emodiversity—by assigning a value of zero 157 
for the corresponding (pi × ln pi) term in Shannon’s formula
3
—effectively transformed Never 158 
into a missing response.  In turn, this meant that a decision had to be made about how to 159 
handle cases where the participant did in fact fail to respond to one or more items, because to 160 
treat a genuine missing response as being identical to a response of Never would represent a 161 
serious distortion of the meaning of the items composing the scale.  Quoidbach et al. did not 162 
discuss this problem in their article, but from an examination of their examples, the data set 163 
for their Study 1, and their online emodiversity test at http://www.emodiversity.org/, 164 
it appears that their solution was to force participants to answer every question on the mDES 165 
or equivalent measure.  For example, 6,611 participant records in the data set for Quoidbach 166 
et al.’s Study 1 have no data for any of the items on the nine-item MADR-S depression scale, 167 
but a further 848 records have data for between one and eight items, suggesting that no forced 168 
choice was imposed for this scale.  In contrast, 5,879 participants have no data for the mDES, 169 
but none of the records in the data set have partially complete responses for this scale.  This 170 
suggests to us that responding to all items was mandatory, probably being enforced by the 171 
computer system used for the survey.  (We were unable to check the equivalent numbers for 172 
Study 2, as the data set has not been made public.) 173 
                                                 
2
 The nature of the pi × ln pi  formula for calculating the contribution of each item to 
emodiversity means that the scale being used must be (re-)anchored at zero, as noted by 
Quoidbach and colleagues in their emodiversity calculator spreadsheet. 
3
 Although the logarithm of zero is undefined, the (pi × ln pi) term for an item whose value 
(and, hence, pi term) is zero, is defined (with a value of zero). 
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In summary, a decision to measure emodiversity would seem to require researchers to 174 
take a rather Procrustean (and, potentially, bias-inducing) approach to participants: Only 175 
those who are willing and able to provide responses to every item on a scale measuring the 176 
frequency of experienced emotions are candidates for inclusion in calculations of 177 
emodiversity.  However, forcing participants to respond in this way potentially introduces a 178 
number of psychometric problems (Ray, 1990).  It also implies that emodiversity will be 179 
difficult to measure in pencil-and-paper settings, where participants always have the 180 
opportunity to not answer a particular item (whether deliberately or not); to exclude those 181 
who consciously (or accidentally) omit one or more responses might be a source of bias.  182 
Furthermore, the more items in the emotion measurement scale being used, the greater the 183 
chance that participants will omit one or more responses and, hence, that their results will not 184 
be used at all. This potentially creates a perverse incentive for researchers to use shorter 185 
measures, which will not only be less reliable for measuring the emotions that they are 186 
supposed to measure, but will also allow for even less variance in emodiversity. 187 
The values of emodiversity are produced by the use of invalid arithmetic 188 
Quoidbach et al. (2014) stated that they obtained the pi components of the Shannon 189 
entropy formula by “divid[ing] the number of times an individual experienced [an emotion] 190 
by the total number of times she experienced all types of emotions” (p. 2058).  However, it is 191 
not correct to say that a measure such as the mDES gives an indication of the “number of 192 
times” each emotion was experienced.  Instead, an arbitrary integer value is applied to a 193 
subjective verbal indicator of the frequency with which each emotion was experienced, 194 
ranging from Never (scored as 0) to Most of the time (scored as 4).  But, even if it can be 195 
shown empirically that multi-item ordinal (Likert) scales typically behave empirically like 196 
interval data when summed and averaged (Carifio & Perla, 2007), the act of dividing an 197 
individual number from such a scale by any other number (in this case, the equally-arbitrary 198 
14 
total of all the emotion-frequency scores) is a meaningless operation, and subsequently 199 
multiplying the result of that operation by its own logarithm merely compounds this error.  200 
All that can be said about the results of such a numerical manipulation is that the pi terms 201 
corresponding to more frequent experiences of each emotion will be larger than those 202 
corresponding to less frequent experiences, but the magnitude of this relation is essentially 203 
arbitrary, and will vary depending on the frequency of experience of other emotions endorsed 204 
by the same participant.  Even if the range of possible emotion-frequency responses were to 205 
be extended to 0–100, as discussed earlier, it would seem to be difficult to defend the idea 206 
that this creates an interval scale, with a value of 60 somehow representing experiencing an 207 
emotion “twice as often” as a value of 30. 208 
The equal desirability of all emotions on the scale being used 209 
One of the limitations of Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) operationalization of emodiversity 210 
is that it places equal weight on all of the emotions on the scale that is used (which, as we 211 
noted in our main article, is already a somewhat arbitrary selection from the possible 212 
taxonomy of emotions).  Yet, just as not all forms of biological evenness are necessarily 213 
desirable (a hectare of African savanna that currently contains an equal biomass of wildebeest 214 
and lions is likely to undergo some kind of upheaval in the near future), so it is not clear that 215 
it is beneficial for people to experience all emotions, even those typically considered 216 
“positive,” with equal frequency.  For example, while it might be good for people to 217 
experience alertness or contentment Most of the time, it might be better for the stress levels of 218 
their family and friends if these same individuals experienced pride or awe only Some of the 219 
time.  Yet, Quoidbach et al.’s theoretical approach—which, for any given level of richness, 220 
rewards evenness with a higher emodiversity score—implies that all emotions (at least, those 221 
of a given valence) are created equal, and that experiencing them all with the same 222 
frequency—whatever that frequency might be—is a good thing. 223 
15 
The effect of adding quadratic terms to the regression models 224 
Cortina (1993) noted that when predictors are highly correlated, the effects of their 225 
interaction term can become confounded with the effects of higher order (typically quadratic) 226 
terms of each predictor.  We therefore tested the effects of adding the square of emotion and 227 
emodiversity terms to the principal regression models for positive and negative emodiversity 228 
in Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) Study 1, using Cortina’s (1993, p. 918) three-step process. 229 
For positive emotion and emodiversity, R
2
 was .391 at step 1 (two predictors, cf. 230 
Table 1, section P.2 in our main article), .397 at step 2 (after adding the two quadratic terms), 231 
and .400 at step 3 (after adding the interaction).  The added variance explained by the 232 
interaction (R
2
 increase of .003) for positive emotion and emodiversity was therefore the 233 
same as in Quoidbach et al.’s (2014) basic model. 234 
For negative emotion and emodiversity, R
2
 was .460 at Cortina’s (1993) step 1, .465 235 
at step 2, and .466 at step 3 (after adding the interaction), so that the added variance explained 236 
by the interaction after accounting for the confounding effects of the quadratic term (an 237 
increase in R
2
 of .001) was only approximately one-sixth of what was observed by Quoidbach 238 
et al. (2014) in their basic model for negative emotion and emodiversity when the interaction 239 
term was added.  (As sections N.1 and N.2 of Table 1 in our main article show, the 240 
interaction term was the only source of extra explained variance in the regressions for 241 
negative emotion and emodiversity; adding negative emodiversity on its own to a regression 242 
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